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Abstract
Government to government transfers are treated understandably as exogenous in open economy macro
models. Even private transfer like remittances are treated as exogenous in the extant literature. In this
paper we examine the e¤ects of endogenous private transfer (remittances) on the real exchange rates using
a dynamic two-sector dependent economy model. We examine the e¤ects of demand and supply shocks and
found that the dynamic patterns for real exchange rates depends on endogeneity of the transfer and the
factor intensity of the traded and nontraded sectors.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
The transfer problem has been receiving attention since the great debate of Keynes (1929) and Ohlin
(1929) regarding excess burden of German reparation payment after the World War I. There have been
great deal of discussion about the possibility of adverse real exchange rate movements resulting from income
transfer. Researchers obtained similar results in relation to foreign aid (for example, see Djajic et al, 1999).
The "Dutch Disease" literature examine the e¤ects of resource discovery and its corresponding adverse
impact on the real exchange rates (Corden and Neary, 1982). Brock (1996) and Turnovsky and Sen (1995)
discussed this transfer issues in a dynamic dependent economy model.
All these transfers are government to government transfers. However, we have been observing a
new trend in transfer of income from migrants to recipients at home. The size of remittances is growing
rapidly and it is surpassing the o¢ cial development assistance for many developing countries (for details see
Chami et al, 2008). Researchers have examined the e¤ects of remittances on the real exchange rates, the
economic growth and welfare of the recipient countries (e.g., Lucas and Stark, 1985; Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999;
Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah, 2005; Acosta et al, 2007; and Lopez et al, 2007). However, all these papers
assume that the size of the remittances is exogenous. Researchers found that remittance ows are in general
countercyclical (Lucas and Stark, 1985) since the main motive for remittances is altruism. Some, however,
found examples of procyclical remittances (Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2007). Although understandably the
o¢ cial transfers in open economy macro models are treated exogenous to the model, we believe that the
private transfers like remittances should be treated as an endogenous outcome of the decisions of the agents
in the economy. We also believe that endogenous private transfer (remittances) should be treated as the
result of the labor allocation decision of the household in labor-exporting country.
The national income of the oil exporting countries increased due to a large increase in oil price.
Consequently, the expansion of traded and nontraded good sectors in these countries attracted a large
number of skilled and unskilled workers from the neighboring developing countries. Thus countries like
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Yemen, and others have been receiving large remittance ows since the late 1970s
and it has become very signicant in size now. The impact of oil price shocks on the real exchange rates
received attention (for example, Amano and van Norden, 1998) but researchers deal with only the supply
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shock side of the increase in energy prices. They do not take into account the income ow from the oil rich
countries (remittances or other factor rewards) resulting from such a rise in the price of oil. Researchers also
discuss real exchange rate behavior in a two sector dependent economy (for example, Brock and Turnovsky,
1994; Morshed and Turnovsky, 2004) but they did not account for the income ow (remittances) from the
rest of the world. Also, some researchers examine the e¤ects of remittances on the real exchange rates using
two sector models (Acosta et al, 2007; Lopez et al, 2007) but they treat remittances as exogenous1 . In this
paper we incorporate these three strands of literature in a simple framework and it allows us to examine
the e¤ects of both demand and supply shocks (including oil price shock) on the real exchange rates in a
rich environment. We include endogenous remittances in an intertemporal optimizing model of a small,
oil-importing, and labor-exporting country. Oil is treated as an input in the production function2 . This is
a two sector dependent economy model where both traded and nontraded goods are produced by capital,
labor, and oil.
We found that the e¤ects of endogenous and exogenous transfers on the real exchange rates are
signicantly di¤erent. While the e¤ect of endogenous transfer (remittances) does not depend on the sectoral
factor intensities, the e¤ects of exogenous transfer crucially depends on the factor intensity of the traded
and nontraded sectors. If these structural di¤erences are not taken into account then we expect di¤erent
empirical results from di¤erent countries and country groups. And Chami et al (2008) report that there is
no consensus in empirical research about the impact of remittances on the real exchange rate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and derives the
macroeconomic equilibrium. In Section 3 we calibrate the economy and simulate numerically the transitional
dynamics of the economy. Section 4 contains some concluding comments.
2 Model
We construct an intertemporal optimizing model to analyze the e¤ects of the oil price shocks and
consequent changes in the remittance ow on the real exchange rates of an oil-importing and labor-exporting
1Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2004) showed using Latin and Carribbean countries data that remittances result in real
exchange rate appreciation and thus shifting resources from traded to nontraded sectors.
2Blanchard and Gali (2007) is a recent attempt to include oil as an input in the production function and they argue that
the recent subdued response for large oil price shocks in the USA is the manifestation of the lower oil content in the economy.
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country. Morshed and Pita (2008) have a similar but one sector model where remittance is an endogeneous
outcome of the decision of the agents in the economy. They discuss the dynamic e¤ects of oil price increase
on welfare while here we have a two-sector dependent economy model and we focus on the dynamics of the
real exchange rates and examine the e¤ects of both demand and supply shocks.
2.1 Firms in Oil Exporting Country
We assume that the rms in oil exporting country use imported labor3 (Lm) to extract oil and they
maximize their prot. Total prot from oil production is
 = pf(Lm)  wLm (1)
and the rst order condition is
pfLm(Lm) = w (2)
which would yield demand for labor curve in the oil exporting country.
2.2 Economy of the Labor Exporting Country
The representative houshold in a dependent economy consumes both traded good and nontraded good
and maximizes the following utility function
Z 1
0
U(CT ; CN )e
 tdt (3)
subject to the constraint
_B = +F (KT ; LT ; NT ) CT +[H(KN ; LN ; NN ) CN  I] TL+rB+w(1 LT  LN ) p(NT +NN ) (4)
The agent accumulates net foreign bond, B, and earns a given world interest rate, r. Production of
both traded and nontraded good requires in addition to capital and labor, some amount of oil, N . Here
F (KT ; LT ; NT ) is the production function of traded good and H(KN ; LN ; NN ) is the production function
of nontraded goods. These production functions have all the neoclassical properties i.e. all factors have
3All factors other than imported labor are suppressed in the production function as they do not change our analysis. For
further discussion please see Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996)
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positive, but diminishing, marginal product and also these production functions exhibits constant returns
to scale. TL is the lumpsum tax to nance the government expenditure on both traded and nontraded
goods, and I is investment. Since agents use oil as a productive input in both traded and nontraded goods
production, agents have to pay for oil at price p which is exogenous to the model. This exogeneity of p will
allow us to examine the e¤ects of oil price shock on the real exchange rate in this economy. All prices are
normalized by the price of traded good. Here  represents the relative price of nontraded good in terms of
traded good. We assume that the law of one price holds for the traded good and thus  can be treated as
real exchane rate. Also,  is the government to government transfer (exogenous transfer).
The representative household allocates its given one unit of labor time in production of traded good,
nontraded good (LT and LN ), and sends the remaining amount of labor (1   LT   LN ) as migrant labor
to oil rich countries. The migrant labor earns wage w and send the earnings back home. Labor is perfectly
mobile and so in equilibrium wages should be equal in three productive activities (production of traded good,
nontraded good, and wage in oil rich countries). We treat the total amount of remittances, w(1 LT  LN );
equal to the total earnings of the migrants in the oil exporting country for the following three reasons.
First, total consumption, C, includes consumption of the migrants. Second, the very restrictive immigration
policies in the oil exporting countries provide huge incentives to workers to send most of their income to
home. Third, the remittances ow eases the foreign exchange constraint of the poor developing countries
and thus for the poor country one unit of income received as remittances (foreign exchange) is e¤ectively
more than one unit of income sent by the migrants.
We assume that only nontraded good can be converted into capital without any adjustment costs.
This assumption is not too restrictive as it may appear as Brock and Turnovsky (1994) showed that the
dynamic properties of a dependent economy crucially depends on whether some amount of nontraded good
is being converted into capital or not, since the amount of investment is now bounded by the productive
capacity of the economy. They also showed that the dynamic properties remain qualitative the same even
if we assume that both traded and nontraded goods can be converted into capital. There is no depreciation
in this model. Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors.
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The capital accumulation in the economy can be described by
_K = _KT + _KN = I (5)
where
I = H(KN ; LN ; NN )  CN  GN (6)
where GN is the government purchase of nontraded goods.
The optimality conditions are
UT (CT ; CN ) =  (7)
UN (CT ; CN ) =  (8)
FK(KT ; LT ; NT ) = HK(KN ; LN ; NN ) (9)
FL(KT ; LT ; NT ) = w = HL(KN ; LN ; NN ) (10)
FN (KT ; LT ; NT ) = p = HN (KN ; LN ; NN ) (11)
_

= r  HK(KN ; LN ; NN ) (12)
r =  
_

(13)
and also the transversality conditions are
Ltt!1Ke t = 0; and Ltt!1Be t = 0: (14)
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These are standard results. Using equations (9),(10),(11) and using w from equation (2) and
K = KT +KN (15)
we can derive
Vi = Vi(K;; p) (16)
where Vi 2 f KT ; KN ; LT ; LN ; NT ; NNg.
The equation (13) implies that to obtain a steady-state nite consumption, since world interest rate,
r, and rate of time preference, , both are assumed to be constant, we require  = r . This means the
marginal utility  remains constant over all time, i.e.  = 4 .
We have a passive government in this model. It nances its expenditure on traded and nontraded
good by imposing lump-sum taxes, so that TL = GT +GN . Also for simplicity we assume that government
spending yield no utility.
2.3 Macroeconomic Equilibrium
Using equations (7) and (8) we obtain traded and nontraded consumption CT and CN in the form:
CT = CT (; ) (17)
CN = CN (; ) (18)
The macroeconomic equilibrium can be summarized by the following autonomous system in two
variables K and :
_ = r   HK(KN (K;; p); LN (K;; p); NN (K;; p)) (19)
and we also have
_K = HK(KN (K;; p); LN (K;; p); NN (K;; p))  CN (; ) GN (20)
4For a detailed discussion about the implications of this condition please see Turnovsky(1997).
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together with the current account condition
_B =  + F (KT (K;; p); LT (K;; p); NT (K;; p))  CT (; ) GT + rB
+FL(KT (K;; p); LT (K;; p); NT (K;; p))(1  LT (K;; p)  LN (K;; p))  p(NT (K;; p) +NN (K;; p))(21
2.4 Equilibrium Dynamics
Linearizing equations (19) and (20) around steady state values (~; ~K), the dynamics of  and K can be
approximated by: 
_
_K

=

a11 a12
a21 a22

   ~
K   ~K

(22)
where
a11 =  ~[HKK @KN
@
+HKL
@LN
@
+HKN
@NN
@
]; a12 =  ~[HKK @KN
@K
+HKL
@LN
@K
+HKN
@NN
@K
]
a21 = HK
@KN
@
+HL
@LN
@
+HN
@NN
@
  @CN
@
; a22 = HK
@KN
@K
+HL
@LN
@K
+HN
@NN
@K
With a reasonable structure of production we can show that the determinant is negative, implying
that the equilbrium is a saddlepoint. Since real exchange rate  is free to jump instantaneously and capital
K is constrained to move sluggishly, the equilibrium yields a unique stable saddle path.
We denote the stable eigenvalue by , so that the (linearized) stable solution may be written in the
form:
   ~ = Aet (23)
and
K   ~K =   a11
a12
Aet (24)
The constant A can be determined from plugging in t = 0 in equation (24) and we obtain
A =
(K0   ~K)a12
  a11
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2.5 Current Account Dynamics
We derive the (linearized) current account dynamics by following Turnovsky (1997). We rst linearize
the equation (21) around its steady state and then substitute the linear equations (23) and (24). By imposing
the transversality condition we then obtain
B0   ~B   Z
  r = 0 (25)
where
Z = 
1A+
2
  a11
a12
A and

1 = FK
@KT
@
+ FN
@NT
@
  @CT
@
  FL @LN
@
+ (1  LT   LN )

FKL
@KT
@
+ FLL
@LT
@
+ FLN
@NT
@


2 = FK
@KT
@K
+ FN
@NT
@K
  FL @LN
@K
+ (1  LT   LN )

FKL
@KT
@K
+ FLL
@LT
@K
+ FLN
@NT
@K

Using these results we can derive the path of bond as
B(t) = ~B +
Z
  r e
t (26)
2.6 Steady State
At steady state _ = _K = _B = 0 and these conditions yields the steady-state relationships:
HK(KN ( ~K; ~; p); LN ( ~K; ~; p); NN ( ~K; ~; p)) = r (27)
FK(KT ( ~K; ~; p); LT ( ~K; ~; p); NT ( ~K; ~; p)) = ~r (28)
H(KN ( ~K; ~; p); LN ( ~K; ~; p); NN ( ~K; ~; p)) = CN (; ~) +GN (29)
F (KT ( ~K; ~; p); LT (:); NT (:)) +  =
CT (; ~) +GT   r ~B + p(NT (:) +NN (:))  (1  LT (:)  LN (:))FL(KT (:); LT (:); NT (:)) (30)
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These equations (27,28,29,30) alongwith equations (10,11) at the steady state values and also the
intertemporal solvency condition equation(25) jointly determines the equilibrium values of ~KT ; ~KN ; ~LT ;
~LN ; ~NT ; ~NN ; ; ~B and ~ for a given value of p.
3 The Dynamics of the Real Exchange Rates: A Numerical Analy-
sis
Since the model is highly nonlinear we conducted numerical analysis adopting the following utility and
production functions:
Utility function:
U =
1

 
CTC
1 
N

where  1 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1 (31)
Production functions at home for traded and nontraded goods are
F (KT ; LT ; NT ) = AK

TL

TN
1  
T (32)
H(KN ; LN ; NN ) =MK

NL

NN
1  
N
and the production function in oil exporting country is
f(Lm) = CL
 
m (33)
where Lm = 1  LT   LN .
Our simulations are based on the following standard parameter vaules, characterizing the benchmark
economy:
A = 1:5; M = 1; C = 1;  = 0:06;  = 0:35;  = 0:62;  = 0:25;  = 0:72
 = 0;  = 0:5;  = 0:5;  =  1:5; p = 1; GT = 0:12; GN = 0:3
These parameters yield a benchmark equilibrium where traded good sector is more capital intensive.
We also switch the values of parameters  and  as well as  and  and keep all other parameters the
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same to obtain another benchmark equilibrium where nontraded good sector is more capital intensive. In
Table 1 (A & B) we report results for both the cases when oil price is increased. The steady-state e¤ects in
response to demand and supply shocks are reported in Table 2. Here 11  = 0:4 is the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. The extant empirical evidence suggests that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
small and so our choice of parameter  =  1:5 is a reasonable one5 . The aggregate productivity parameters
for home production of traded good and nontraded good are A and M , respectively, while the aggregate
productivity parameter in oil exporting country is C. The share of labor in traded good production is about
31%, while the share of labor in nontraded good is about 63%. The share of oil in traded good production
is about 3% while the same is for the nontraded sector is about 5%. The share of labor in oil production
in oil exporting country is assumed to be 50%. The rate of discount is chosen to be 6%. We also assume
the oil price to be equal to 1 to obtain the benchmark equilibrium. The government purchases of traded
good GT , and nontraded good GN are chosen in such a way that the share of government purchase out of
traded good at the benchmark is about 12.6% while the share of government purchase of nontraded good
is about 33%6 . These parameters yield a reasonable benchmark equilibrium with capital output ratio 3.81,
initial labor allocation at home 93%, and remittance to GDP ratio 5%7 when traded sector is more capital
intensive. However, the benchmark equilibrium for the case when nontraded sector is more capital intensive
yields capital output ratio 4.86, initial labor allocation at home 91%, and remittances to GDP ratio 6.3%
(shown in Table 1.B).
We compute steady state ratios and then examine the steady-state responses to permanent shocks in
oil price by allowing oil price increase by 10%, 20%, and 40%. The dynamic paths of real exchange rates
(RER) are shown in Figure 1. We obtain the time paths of consumptions of traded and nontraded goods
and this allows us to examine the welfare e¤ects. Results from welfare calculations are given in the last row
of the Table 1.A and 1.B . Following Turnovsky and Sen (1995) we study the e¤ects of both demand and
supply shocks by increasing the size of transfer, government purchases of traded good and nontraded good
(demand shocks), and increase in productivity of traded good and nontraded good (supply shocks). The
5For detail discussion on empirical evidence please see Guvenen (2006).
6Empirically these are reasonable proportions (see Morshed and Turnovsky, 2004).
7Chami et al. (2005) report that the ratios of remittances and GDP for countries like Lebanon, Yemen, Jordan, Samoa and
others are above 0.16. For a recent update see Chami et al (2008).
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dynamic paths of the RER in response to these shocks are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
3.1 Endogenous Transfer
An increase in oil pirce increases the value of marginal product of migrant labor. Since labor is perfectly
mobile, this oil price increase will increase the rate of migration of labor to oil-exporting countries. Thus a
larger ow of remittances would be realized. We consider this ow of remittances as endogenous transfer.
Table 1 shows the e¤ects of permanent increase in oil price on a number of macroeconomic variables. It is
clear from these results that an oil price increase will increase the proportion of work force migrating to oil
exporting countries and thus the ratio of remittances to GDP increases.
[Table 1 ]
The steady-state RER remains the same in response to oil price shocks of di¤erent size. Since labor
is perfectly mobile between sectors and between countries, the burden of adjustment rests on the labor
movement and we observe no change in the steady-state RER. However, the dynamic paths of the RER
(shown in Figure 1) depend on the size of the shock. For example, an increase in oil price by 10% will drop
the RER immediately from 1.84 to 1.80 and then gradually it will go back to the long-run equilibrium level
when traded sector is more capital intensive. The results are qualitatively similar in the case where nontraded
sector is more capital intensive (see Figure 1.B). The size of the drop would be more pronounced for a larger
increase in oil price. For an increase in oil price by 40%, the RER drops to 1.57 and then gradually increases.
An increase in oil price increases the value of marginal product of labor in oil exporting countries and thus
more labor would go abroad and this will bring in more remittances. However, an increase in oil price reduces
the use of oil in both traded and nontraded good sectors and since oil is a complementary input, the labor
use in the traded sector declines immediately. We assume that only the nontraded good can be converted
into capital and thus nontraded output has atleast one more use (in capital formation) than that of traded
output. Thus the relative production of nontraded good increases. Consequently, the price of nontraded
good relative to traded good declines initially. Note that the capital stock in the production processes is a
sluggish variable. Once capital deccumulation starts after an oil price increase, we observe that the marginal
product of labor and marginal product of oil declines, then it further reduces the labor use and oil use in
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both traded and nontraded good production. As a result, the RER starts rising. The drop in the RER is
more pronounced if the size of the oil price increase becomes larger. The dynamic paths are qualitatively
similar even when the sectoral capital intensity is reversed because oil is used as a complementary input in
both sectors.
A permanent increase in oil price yields negative impacts on the production of both traded and
nontraded goods but more labor is sent to the oil producing countries and these workers bring in more
remittances. The net e¤ect of these two opposing forces determines which way the total welfare will change.
In our simulation we observe a decline in welfare in response to an increase in oil price. But the size of the
decline is not proportional. For example, an increase in oil price by 10 percent reduces the welfare by 0.65%
while an increase in oil price by 40% reduces the total welfare by 1.51%. The positive remittance e¤ect
neutralizes some part of the negative supply shock resulting from a permanent increase in oil prices.
[Figure 1]
3.2 Demand Shocks
We examine the e¤ects of demand and supply shocks on the RER and found that sectoral factor intensity
is crucial for the RER dynamics only for the demand shocks. We report the steady-state e¤ects on labor
allocation, capital-output ratios, remittances-GDP ratios, shares of government expenditures, and the RER
in response to the demand and supply shocks in Table 2 A (when traded sector is more capital intensive)
and Table 2 B (when nontraded sector is more capital intensive).
(a) Increase in Transfer,  .
An increase in exogenous transfer (from 0 to 4% of GDP) is essentially an increase in long run wealth
of the economy and so it lowers the shadow value of wealth. Consequently, consumption of both traded
and nontraded good increases amd capital moves to nontraded good sector from the traded good sector
immediately. Since other inputs in the production functions are complementary inputs, more labor and
more oil will be used in the production of nontraded good. As the traded good sector is more capital
intensive than the nontraded good sector, there will be a sharp increase in the production of nontraded good
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and also a sharp decrease in the production of traded good. Thus initially we observe a drop in the RER
and then as the economy starts accumulating more capital, capital would be allocated to traded sector and
will attract labor and oil into the traded sector. The RER will start rising gradually to the equilibrium
level of the RER. A demand shock does not change the long run RER. Nonetheless, an increase in transfer
certainly increases welfare.
Figure 2 , A(i) shows the time path of the RER in response to an increase in transfer when traded
good sector is more capital intensive while Figure 2, B(i) shows the same when when nontraded good sector
is more capital intensive. The RER jumps down to 1.82 (steady state is 1.84) immediately in response to an
increase in transfer when traded good sector is more capital intensive. The RER then increases gradually
as more capital is being accumulated. An increase in transfer will increase demand for both traded and
nontraded good. Since the nontraded good sector requires propotionately higher labor per unit of capital
(traded good more capital intensive), proportionately higher fraction of labor will move to nontraded sector
from traded sector. Capital will be relatively abundant. Since capital and labor are complementary input,
this also increases the marginal productivity of capital in nontraded sector. These dual positive e¤ects
immediately increase the nontraded output more than the long-run level and we observe an initial large
decline the RER. As capital accumulation starts (note that nontraded good can be converted into capital)
and the capital reallocation between traded and nontraded sector starts attracting labor to traded sector
and thus it changes the product mix and we observe a gradual rise in the RER to the long run equilibrium
level of the RER.
When nontraded good is more capital intensive (Figure 2, B(i)), an increase in transfer will increase
demand for both traded and nontraded goods but the factor movement will have opposite results than what
happened when traded good is more capital intensive (discussed above). Since the nontraded sector is more
capital intensive, relatively more capital is required to move from traded good sector to nontraded sector
and since capital will be relatively scarce and thus its movement would be constrained and so the increase
in nontraded output will not be very large. As a result, initially the price of nontraded good will rise and
so would be the RER. But once the capital accumulation will start, more capital will be available and the
RER will start falling and will eventually approach to long run equilibrium level. Note that Trunovsky
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and Sen (1995) found no transitional dynamics in a similar dependent economy model. The presence of
remittances and labor allocation in three uses (traded sector, nontraded sector, and foreign country) allows
this to happen.
In order to examine the contrasting e¤ects of endogenous transfer (remittances resulting from oil
price increase) and exogenous transfer, we need to focus on Figure 1 and Figure 2 A(i) and B(i). An
endogenous transfer (remittances) reduces immediately the relative price of nontraded goods irrespective of
capital intensity of the sectors while an exogenous transfer  , reduces the relative price of nontraded good
when traded sector is more capital intensive (Figure 2 A(i)) but it increases the relative price of nontraded
good when nontraded good sector is more capital intensive (Figure 2 B (i)). Thus, the e¤ect of transfer on
the real exchange rate depends not only on the nature of the transfer (endogenous vs exogenous) but also
on the factor intensity of the sectors.
(b) Increase in GT
We examine the e¤ects of an increase in government purchase of traded good by 25 percent on the real
exchange rate. Like Turnovsky and Sen (1995), we observe no change in the RER in the long run. However,
an increase in government expenditure on the traded good by 25 percent will yield a very small changes
in the pattern of labor use and so the remittances-GDP ratio remains virtually the same. An increase in
the government purchase requires nancing of the government by an equal amount of lump-sum tax. Thus
the shadow value of wealth increases and as a result consumption of traded and nontraded good declines
(since both goods are normal good). But the increase in direct demand for traded good from the government
would outweigh the decrease in demand for traded good emanating from income e¤ect (indirect e¤ect). As
a result, we nd that output in the traded sector increases while it declines in the nontraded sector. Since
the traded sector is more capital intensive, the RER jumps above the long run RER and then gradually
comes back to the long run equilibrium (initial level). The transitional paths of RER are shown in Figure 2
A(ii) for the case when traded good sector is more capital intensive while it is shown in Figure 2 B (ii) when
the capital intensity is reversed. While in a similar model Turnovsky and Sen (1995) and Morshed and
Turnovsky (2004) observed no change in RER in response to an increase in government purchase of traded
good (irrespective of the factor intensity), we observe an initial jump in the real exchange rate when traded
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good sector is more capital intensive and an initial drop in the RER when the factor intesity is reversed.
This is due to the fact that when the production conditions at home change, households can reallocate their
labor and, if required, household can send more labor abroad or can bring back home some migrated labor.
An increse in the demand for traded good will attract resources to traded good sector from nontraded good
sector and thus the relative abundace of factors (capital and labor) depends on the sectoral intensity of
the two sectors. In terms of welfare calculation, we nd that a 25% increase in government purchase on
traded good reduces welfare by 1.45 percent when traded good sector is more capital intensive while welfare
reduction would be 1.58 percent when nontraded good sector is more capital intensive.
[Table 2]
(C) Increase in GN
An increase in the government purchase of nontraded good will yield a di¤erent result. The excess
demand for nontraded good originating from the additional government purchase would increase the price
of nontraded good relative to traded good when traded good is more capital intensive and thus the RER
will decline. This purchase does not change the RER in the long run. Also regarding welfare, an increase
in the purchase of nontraded good by the government would not only reduce the consumption of nontraded
good but also some of it could have been converted into capital (only nontraded output can be converted
to capital) and thus the welfare loss would be very large and it is about 7.01 percent when traded sector is
more capital intensive while it would be 4.5% when the factor intensity is reversed.
[Figure 2]
Unlike Turnovsky and Sen (1995) and Morshed and Trunovsky (2004) who observed no change in the
RER in response to demand shocks when traded sector is more capital intensive, we, however, observe that
the demand shocks (government purchases of traded and nontraded goods) generate transitional dynamics
even when traded sector is more capital intensive.
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3.3 Supply Shocks
The e¤ects of supply shocks on the RER are also examined. The dynamic paths of the RER are shown
in Figure 3.
(A) Increase in A.
An increase in the productivity of the traded sector, A, will make more traded output available and
thus the relative price of nontraded good will increase when traded good is more capital intensive. The new
steady-state RER would be higher. An increase in traded output increases welfare (9.55 percent increase
when traded sector is more capital intensive). These results are qualitatively similar (9.86% increase) for the
case where nontraded good is more capital intensive.
(B) Increase in B
An increase in productivity in nontraded sector will increase nontraded output. As the price of
nontraded good is determined by the demand and supply situation at home and due to increased availability
of nontraded output, the price of nontraded output declines signicantgly and so is the steady state RER.
As a result, we observe the welfare gain of about 10.3% in response to an increase in productivity of the
nontraded sector by 10 percent. Since aggregate capital K is the sluggish variable, the burden to adjsut to
these productivity shock rests on the RER and so initially the RER jumps up but later it gradually drops
to new equilibrium RER which is lower than the initial equilibrium RER. The results shown in Fogure 3 are
qualitatively similar irrespective of the factor intensity ordering of the traded and nontraded sectors.
[Figure 3]
We observe overshooting of the RER in response to supply shock (both in response to increase in
productivity of traded and nontraded sector) irrespective of the factor intensity of the two sectors. However,
Turnovsky and Sen (1995) observe instantaneous jump in the RER when traded sector is more capital
intensive. Also, they report transitional dynamics of the RER when nontraded good is more capital intensive.
16
4 Conclusions
Income transfers are generally government to government transfer and in dynamic models these are
treated as exogenous. Recently, private transfers like remittances have been gaining importance as it is
becoming a dominant source of income transfer and also it is endogenous in nature. However, remittances
are treated as exogenous in the extant literature. We incorporate the endogenous transfer (remittances) in
a two-sector dependent economy model and found that the dynamics of the real exchange rates are very
di¤erent from the models that treat transfer as exogenous. Moreover, the sectoral capital intensity is crucial
to the nature of the dynamics.
We also examine the e¤ects of demand and supply shocks and observed marked di¤erences in the
dynamic paths than those noted in the literature. Recently, Chami et al (2008) found that there is no clear
consensus about the e¤ects of remittances on the real exchange rates and we nd that the nature of the
dynamics depends on the sources of the shocks (demand and supply shocks), the structure of production
(sectoral factor intensity), and the endogeneity of the transfer.
Rodrik (2007) showed that undervaluation of the real exchange rate (a low PNT =PT ) is instrumental
to boosting economic growth in the developing countries. The results from our more general model allow
policy makers to identify which shock will yield under what circumstances a growth friendly undervaluation.
Moreover, how a dependent economy can absorb a supply shock like oil price shock can be easily deduced
from this model.
References
Acosta, P.A., E.K.K. Lartey, and F. S. Mandelman (2007). "Remittances and the Dutch Disease,"
Federal Reseve Bank of Atlanta Working paper 2007-8, April.
Amano, R. A. and S. van Norden (1998). "Oil Prices and the Rise and Fall of the US Real Exchange
Rate," Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 299-316.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C, and S. Pozo (2004). "WorkersRemittances and the Real Exchange Rate: A
Paradox of Gifts," World Development, Vol. 32, No. 8, pp. 1407-1417.
17
Brock, P.L. (1996). "International Transfers, the Relative Price of Nontraded Goods and the Current
Account," Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 163-180.
Brock, P.L., and S.J. Turnovsky (1994). "The Dependent Economy Model with Both Traded and
Nontraded Capital Goods," Review of International Economics, Vol. 2, pp.306-325.
Blanchard, Olivier, and Jordi Gali (2007). "The Macroeconomic E¤ects of Oil Shocks: Why are the
2000s So Di¤erent From the 1970s?" NBER Working Paper 13368, September.
Chami, R, A. Barajas, T. Cosimano , C. Fullenkamp, M. Gapen, and P. Montiel (2008). Macroeco-
nomic Consequences of Remittances, Occasional Paper 259, IMF, Washington D.C..
Chami, Ralph, C. Fullenkamp, and S. Jahjah (2005). "Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of
Capital for Development?" IMF Sta¤ Papers, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 55-81.
Corden, W.M., J. P. Neary (1982). "Booming Sector and De-Industrialisation in a Small Open
Economy," Economic Journal Vol. 92, pp. 825-848.
Djajic, S., S. Lahiri, and P. Raimondos-Moller (1999). "Foreign Aid, Domestic Investment and
Welfare," The Economic Journal, Vol 109 (October), pp. 698-707.
Guvenen, F. (2006). "Reconciling Conicting Evidence on the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitu-
tion: A Macroeconomic Perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol 53, pp. 1451-1472.
Ilahi, Nadeem, and Saqib Jafarey (1999). "Guestworker Migration, Remittances, and the Extended
Family: Evidence From Pakistan," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 58, pp. 485-512.
Keynes, J.M. (1929). "The German Transfer Problem," Economic Journal, Vol 39, pp. 1-7.
Lopez, H., L. Molina, and M. Bussolo (2007). "Remittances and the Real Exchange Rate," World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4213, April.
Lucas, Robert E.B., and Oded Stark (1985). "Motivation to Remit: Evidence from Botswana,"
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, pp 901-918.
Lueth, Erik, and Marta Ruiz-Arranz (2007). "Are WorkersRemittances a Hedge Against Macroeco-
nomic Shocks? The Case of Sri Lanka," IMF Working Paper, 07/22, February.
Morshed, A.K.M. Mahbub, and S.J. Turnovsky (2004). "Sectoral Adjustment Costs and Real Ex-
change Rate Dynamics in a Two Sector Dependent Economy," Journal of International Economics, Vol. 63,
18
pp. 147-177.
Morshed, A.K.M. Mahbub, and Basharat A. Pita (2008). "Oil Prices and Remittances: Impacts of
Oil Price Shocks on the Macroeconomy of a Small, Oil Importing, and Labor Exporting Country," Working
Paper, Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University Carbondale.
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogo¤ (1996). Foundations of International Macroeconomics, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
Ohlin, B.G. (1929). "Transfer Di¢ culties, Real and Imagined," Economic Journal, Vol 39, pp. 172-
178.
Rodrik, D. (2007). "The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence," mimeo.
Turnovsky, S. J. (1997). International Macroeconomic Dynamics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Turnovsky, S.J. and P. Sen (1995). "Investment in a Two-Sector Dependent Economy", Journal of
Japanese and International Economies, 9, 29-55.
19
Table 1
Effects of Oil Price Increase on Macro Variables
A.Traded Sector is More Capital Intensive
Variable Benchmark Price Increase 10% Price Increase 20% Price Increase 40%
KT
LT
9.855 9.816 9.780 9.717
KN
LN
6.062 6.038 6.016 5.977
K
Y 3.805 3.814 3.823 3.846
LT 0.306 0.294 0.281 0.251
L N 0.627 0.624 0.621 0.613
Lm 0.067 0.082 0.098 0.136
Re mit tan ce
GDP 0.049 0.061 0.075 0.108
GT
YT
0.126 0.132 0.138 0.156
G N
YN
0.329 0.332 0.335 0.341
RER 1.842 1.841 1.840 1.839
RER at t = 0 1.798 1.741 1.566
% Change in Welfare -0.650 -1.156 -1.506
B. Nontraded Sector More Capital Intensive
Variable Benchmark Price Increase 10% Price Increase 20% Price Increase 40%
KT
LT
8.262 8.224 8.190 8.129
KN
LN
13.433 13.371 13.315 13.217
K
Y 4.864 4.884 4.908 4.968
LT 0.416 0.398 0.380 0.337
L N 0.497 0.495 0.492 0.487
Lm 0.087 0.107 0.128 0.176
Re mit tan ce
GDP 0.063 0.079 0.097 0.141
GT
YT
0.123 0.129 0.136 0.154
G N
YN
0.262 0.265 0.267 0.272
RER 1.184 1.185 1.185 1.186
RER at t = 0 1.157 1.125 1.040
% Change in Welfare -0.523 -0.959 -1.557
 
Table 2
Effects of Demand and SupplyShocks on Macro Variables
A. TradedGood Sector is More Capital Intensive
Variable Benchmark b (0 to 0.1) GT (0.12 to 0.15) GN (0.3 to 0.375) ProductivityTraded (1.5 to 1.75) Productivity Nontraded (1 to 1.1)
KT
LT
9.855 9.855 9.855 9.855 9.919 11.211
KN
LN
6.062 6.062 6.062 6.062 6.101 6.896
K
Y 3.805 3.827 3.799 3.829 3.649 3.889
L T 0.306 0.287 0.312 0.285 0.307 0.326
LN 0.627 0.646 0.621 0.648 0.644 0.613
L m 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.049 0.061
Remittances
GDP
0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.030 0.044
GT
YT
0.126 0.134 0.155 0.135 0.107 0.113
GN
YN
0.329 0.319 0.332 0.398 0.318 0.296
RER 1.842 1.842 1.842 1.842 2.150 1.696
RER at t = 0 1.824 1.847 1.821 2.192 1.892
% Change in Welfare 4.855 -1.452 -7.011 9.552 10.304
B. Nontraded Good Sector i s More Capital Intensive
Variable Benchmark b (0 to 0.1) GT (0.12 to 0.15) GN (0.3 to 0.375) ProductivityTraded (1.5 to 1.75) Productivity Nontraded (1 to 1.1)
KT
LT
8.262 8.262 8.262 8.262 8.324 9.584
KN
LN
13.433 13.433 13.433 13.433 13.533 15.581
K
Y 4.864 4.914 4.848 4.906 4.668 4.995
L T 0.416 0.395 0.422 0.399 0.422 0.438
LN 0.497 0.517 0.491 0.514 0.515 0.481
L m 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.063 0.081
Remittances
GDP 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.038 0.059
GT
YT
0.123 0.129 0.151 0.128 0.103 0.112
GN
YN
0.262 0.252 0.265 0.317 0.251 0.234
RER 1.184 1.184 1.184 1.184 1.381 1.061
RER at t = 0 1.197 1.181 1.195 1.428 1.203
% Change in Welfare 5.246 -1.578 -4.524 9.856 8.451  
Figure 1 
Dynamic Response of Real Exchange Rates to Endogenous Transfer Resulting From A 
Permanent Increase in Oil Price 
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Figure 2 
Time Path of Real Exchange Rates in Response to Demand Shocks 
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Figure 3 
Dynamic Path of Real Exchange Rates in Response to Supply Shocks 
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